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ABSTRACT
Interest rate has been the monetary policy tool used by the modern central
banks. For monetary policy to be effective, changes in the policy rate should
influence the short-term money market rate and retail rates. Using an error cor-
rection methodology, this paper examines the short-run and long-run dynamics
of interest rate pass through from the LIBOR to four different UK retail rates. The
results indicate that interest rate pass-through in the UK is incomplete in the
short run, but fairly complete in the long-run and the adjustment of retail rates
depend on whether they are below or above their respective long-run values.
The results also indicate a temporary, but statistically significant change in the
interest rate pass-through since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007. 
1. INTRODUCTION
CENTRAL BANKS IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, including the Bank ofEngland (BoE), conduct their monetary policy through the interest ratechannel. The central bank's official rate is set with the aim of influencing
prices and aggregate demand in the economy. The interest-rate pass-through
(IRPT) is defined as the degree and speed of adjustment of retail interest rates
due to changes in the monetary authority's policy rate (Aydin, 2007).  Monetary
policy is considered to be effective if changes in the policy rates are completely
passed through to retail interest rates over a reasonably short period (Hofmann
and Mizen, 2004). Generally, studies suggest that interest rate pass-through
has been both small in degree and slow in adjustment in response to changes
in the official rate. Moreover, monetary policy easing in contrast to a tightening
one could lead to asymmetric adjustment in retail rates such that output and
prices would be affected differently. It is therefore important to know how much
(the degree of pass-through), how fast (the speed of pass-through) and how sym-
metrically or otherwise retail interest rates adjust to a change in the policy rate. 
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The recent global financial crisis has thrown further challenges to the
monetary authorities. The crisis has forced the Monetary Policy Committee
(MPC) to cut the policy rate to 0.5 per cent and unconventional monetary pol-
icy in terms of quantitative easing was adopted. It is, therefore, important to
investigate the behaviour of the transmission mechanism of the interest rate
during the period. 
The BoE has officially been using interest rate as its main monetary
policy tool based on inflation targeting rule as defined by the government since
the late 1990s, but studies on the IRPT in the UK have generally concentrat-
ed on one or two retail rates. For example, Becker et al.’s (2012) analysis was
limited to mortgage rate, Fuertes et al. (2010) and Panagopoulos et al. (2010)
considered deposit and loan rates while Hofmann and Mizen (2004) covered
deposit and mortgage rates. The UK financial sector has undergone some
changes in the last fifteen years in terms of competition and ownership. There
were a number of mergers and acquisitions as well as entry of foreign banks
into the sector. These will have impact on competition, which will invariably
affect the IRPT.2
In light of the above, this paper extends the previous work in three
aspects. First, it examines the short-run and long-run dynamics of adjust-
ment of four retail rates to changes in the policy rate thereby extending the
number of retail rates covered in the previous studies. Second, the paper
seeks to identify changes in the behaviour of UK banks in setting their retail
rates since the beginning of the financial crisis in summer 2007. Third, as the
paper uses a sample of data-set that covers longer period of time, it will be able
to capture structural changes that took place in the UK financial sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews
the theoretical and empirical foundations of the interest rate pass-through.
Section 3 explains the methodology used in this paper. Section 4 discusses the
data and the estimated results while Section 5 concludes. 
2. INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), using a panel sample of 31 countries that con-
sisted of both developed and developing countries found that short-run pass-
through is slower than long-run pass-through (for details see Espinosa-Vega
and Rebucci, 2003). Specifically, they reported that the lending rate adjusts
by about 67 per cent after 3 months of the policy rate changes and by 97 per
cent in the long run. The study also shows that the degree of stickiness of the
lending rate differ across the countries, especially in the short run. This could
be due to the differences in the structure of the countries’ financial systems.
Other studies on interest rate pass-through point to the fact that loan and
deposit rates respond to changes in the policy rate with a lag. For example,
Heffernan (1993) finds a sluggish adjustment of loan and deposit rate to
changes in the LIBOR. However, Hofmann and Mizen (2004) who use month-
ly data of 90-day time deposits and mortgages over the period 1985-2001
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reported a complete pass-through of the policy rate changes into the retail
rates in the long-run. These results contrast with the findings of Paisley (1994)
who finds that mortgage rates were not responsive to changes in the market
rates in the 1970s. 
Studies on IRPT in the Euro Area countries generally, used annual
data with a notable exception of Mojon (2000) and Kaufmann and Schaler
(2006) that used quarterly data. They found considerable differences of pass-
through across the Euro-area countries. Most of the studies on the IRPT in the
area found that immediate pass through in terms of both deposit and lending
rates appear to be smaller than the long-run pass through.3 The long-term
pass-through is evidently larger, but remains incomplete in the area. 
Another strand of the literature attributes differences in pass-through
according to the type of financial products. For example, Mojon (2000), de
Bondt (2002) and Sander and Kleimeier (2004) conclude that rates on house-
hold loans, savings and overnight deposits are stickier than the rates on cor-
porate loans and time deposits.
In the light of the above, there is an indication that the IRPT is gener-
ally incomplete, particularly, in the short-run. However, there is much debate
on causes of incomplete pass-through. Gropp, Kok Sorensen and
Lichtenberger (2007) identify the degree of competitiveness among financial
institutions as a key determinant of the IRPT. They show that the adjustment
of loan rates to changes in market rates would be larger if financial markets
became more competitive. Hannan and Berger (1991) and Hofmann and Mizen
(2004) provide evidence that limited pass-through could be due to the exis-
tence of adjustment costs. Similarly, Fuertes and Heffernan (2008) explain
sluggish retail market responses could be due to sunk costs, price discrimi-
nation relying on consumer habit and collusions between financial institu-
tions which undermine competition in the financial markets. Consequently,
Cottareli and Kourelis (1994) suggest that removal of constraints on capital
movements, getting rid of constraints on bank competition such as barriers to
entry, ownership of banks by the private sector and the existence of a com-
petitive market for short-term monetary instruments will enhance IRPT. 
Part of the literature focuses mainly on the differences between upward
and downward responsiveness of retail rates to the official rate and they find
that there is asymmetric adjustment. It is observed that loans rates are rigid
to increases while deposit rates are rigid to decreases. Explanations for such
rigidities lie in the customers’ unfavourable reactions to unstable rates and
the unwillingness of the banks to break collusive price arrangements. Such
responses of retail rates to changes in the policy rates have been looked into
by Hannan and Berger (1991) and by Neumark and Sharpe (1992) who find
asymmetrical rigidities in lending and deposit rates. In the same vein, Sander
and Kleimeier (2004) and Hofmann and Mizen (2004) conclude that ‘the speed
of adjustment in retail rates depend on whether the perceived gap between the
retail and the base rates is widening or narrowing’.
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3. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this paper to investigate the IRPT in the UK is the
Error Correction Mechanism (ECM). The advantage of the methodology lies in
its ability to quantify both the degree and speed of adjustment of retail bank
rates sequel to a change in the policy rate. It also allows a distinction between
the long-run relationship of two variables and the short-run adjustment
towards their long-run equilibrium. An ECM which captures both the short-
run and the long-run dynamics of retail rates, xt , and the policy rate, yt,  can
be written as:
where, t=1,…T (which is monthly; 1999M01 to 2009M06),
i=1,…N (each of the retail interest rate like deposit rate, lending rate, etc). The
errors ei,t are assumed to be identically distributed and follow a normal distri-
bution. The term in equation (1), (xi,t-j - x*i,t-j) represents the deviation of the
retail bank rate xi,t-j from its long-run value, which is given by x*i,t-j ; where,
Equation (2) defines the retail interest rate on a product as a linear function
of the official rate. This is based on the fact that the retail rate cannot drift too
far from the official rate over a long period, implying that there should be a
long-run relationship between the two variables (Fuertes and Heffernan,
2008). The lag j is the short term lag representing the delay in the error cor-
rection.  
Equation (1) identifies four aspects of the transmission mechanism of
interest rates. First, the immediate pass-through is given by β. Second, the
parameter γi, measures the adjustment speed. To expect a return to equilibri-
um, the growth, xi,t should be negatively related to the error (xi,t-j - x*i,t-j) ,
such that the parameter γi will be negative. Υ in absolute term, represents how
much of the error or gap (xi,t-j - x*i,t-j)  prevailing at month t-j is corrected dur-
ing month t. Third, Ai is defined as the long-run mark-up, representing how
much the retail rate for a particular banking product is marked above (Ai>0)
or below (Ai<0) the official rate in the long run. Fourth the parameter Ci rep-
resents the long-run pass-through. It measures the degree of the policy rate
that is passed into the retail rates in the long-run. A complete long-run pass-
through means Ci=1. This refers to a banking sector which is perfectly com-
petitive and characterized with no market imperfections like banking costs or
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credit rationing. If the long-run multiplier is less than unity (Ci<1), it means
that there is limited (partial) pass-through in the long-run. A long-run pass-
through larger than unity would be translated as a kind of overshooting,
which Kok and Werner (2006) suggest that it may be due to asymmetry infor-
mation between bankers and borrowers and hence credit risk for bankers.
To avoid problems of endogeneity and estimated long-run coefficients'
biasedness as argued by Warner (2006) and Banerjee et al. (1986), the ECM
in equation (1) can be reparametrised to a dynamic model given by: 
where                         . As a result, equation (3) yields unbiased and consis-
tent measures of the long-run mark-up Ai and pass-through Ci (Fuetes and
Heffernan, 2008). In the long-run steady-state, Δxit=Δyt=0 such that:
and therefore,               and              . This gives (in the long-run): 
In order to identify the appropriate lag length j, k1 and k2 and getting rid of
the possibility of having autocorrelation, a one-step approach to determine the
appropriate lag terms j, k1 and k2 simultaneously through the estimation of
model (3). Maximum number of lags is allowed for both the level and the dif-
ference terms. The optimum lag determined by the Akaike Information Criteria
(AIC) was 6. 
The ECM in equation (1) implicitly assumes that the adjustment of
retail interest rates xit to the deviation from the long-run value given by
(xi,t-j - x*i,t-j) is the same for positive and negative gaps. However, it is inter-
esting to investigate whether interest rates adjust differently depending on
whether they are above or below their equilibrium levels. Based on Kleimeier
and Sander (2008) and Ozdemir (2009), an asymmetric error correction frame-
work could be defined by introducing dummy variables to take into account
possibility of asymmetric adjustment. Dummy variables, which take the fol-
lowing values are generated:
The coefficients associated with the dummy variables will indicate how the
retail interest rate adjusts when the retail interest rate observed (xt) is above
its equilibrium value (xt*), following a change in the policy rate. When asym-
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V=1 if (xi,t-j - x*i,t-j)>  0      W=1 i f  (xi,t-j - x*i,t-j)  <  0
V=0 if (xi,t-j - x*i,t-j)<  0      W=0 i f  (xi,t-j - x*i,t-j)  >  0
metric adjustment is taken into account, the specification of the short-run
dynamic equation takes the following form: 
where                          . The estimated coefficient α1 measures the speed of adjust-
ment in response to a disequilibrium in the past period when xit>x*it while the
estimated coefficient α2 measures the speed of adjustment in the case of past
period disequilibrium when xit<x*it . To account for asymmetric adjustment,
α1 should be significantly different from α2.
As the sample used in this paper includes the financial crisis period,
there is a likelihood of break of cointegration during the period. Therefore,
structural break tests of Bai and Perron (2003) were used to determine the
break dates. The Bai-Perron tests consider the multiple linear regression with
m breaks, which gives m+1 regimes represented as:
where yt is the dependent variable, xt and zt are vectors of covariates. β and δ
are vectors of coefficients while t is the time period with j=1,…,m+1 regimes.
The number of breaks is decided based on the Baysian Information Criteria,
BIC and its modified version proposed by Liu et al (1997), LWZ.4
4. DATA AND THE ESTIMATED RESULTS
The data-set used for this study was sourced from Datastream. A sample of
126 observations, consisting of monthly variables of four retail interest rates,
covering the period 1999:01 - 2009:06 are used. The rates are instant deposit
rate, time deposit rate, secured lending rate and mortgage rate. Instant
deposit rate is the average rate set by UK banks and building societies on
instant access deposits from the household sector. Time deposit rate is the
average interest rate quoted on time deposit for households and lending rate
is the average rates quoted on secured loans for consumption made to indi-
viduals from £1000 to £10000 while mortgage rate is the average rates quot-
ed on loans to households for house purchase. The London Interbank Offered
Rate, LIBOR is used as the exogenous interest rate as it is the rate at which
banks quote each other in the UK for overnight deposits and loans. It also rep-
resents the opportunity cost of the total asset of a bank. It is justifiable to use
the LIBOR in place of policy rate since it is the market rate used by the sec-
tor. The LIBOR also serves as a benchmark to determine the marginal revenue
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of assets and the marginal cost of liabilities. Moreover, it normally moves with
the policy rate (Fuertes and Heffernan, 2008). A comparison of both rates is
shown in Figure 1. Except for the period of mid 2007 where there was a tem-
porary divergence between the two rates, it could be observed that the LIBOR
is generally in line with the BoE policy rate for the whole period. Using the
LIBOR as a proxy for the stance of the BoE’s monetary policy is well estab-
lished in the literature.5 For example, in a recently published paper, Hussain
(2011) used the LIBOR as a proxy for the monetary policy rate.
Literature on interest rates has generally identified interest rates as a non-sta-
tionary series (Kok and Werner, 2006; Fuertes and Heffernan, 2008). It is
therefore imperative to ascertain the level of integration of the series used. The
Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and the Phillips-
Perron Test (Phillips and Perron, 1988) are used to that end. The results of the
two tests are reported in Table 1. It is evident from the results that the null of
a unit root cannot be rejected for all the variables. It could be, therefore, con-
cluded that all the series are integrated of order one, I(1) on levels and sta-
tionary I(0) on first difference. 
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Figure 1: The BoE’s Policy Rate and LIBOR
ADF PP
Variable Level First Difference Level          First Difference
Time Deposit -0.796 (0.369)      -4.442 (0.00*) -1.217 (0.204) -6.404 (0.00*)
Instant Deposit -1.077 (0.253       -5.669 (0.00*) -1.245 (0.194) -5.700 (0.00*)
Lending  Rate -0.946 (0.305)      -5.791 (0.00*) -1.176 (0.218) -5.851 (0.00*)
Mortgage Rate -0.952 (0.303)      -5.849 (0.00*) -1.184 (0.215) -5.929 (0.00*)
LIBOR -1.105 (0.243       -7.493 (0.00*) -1.261 (0.190) -7.614 (0.00*)
BoE Office Rate -1.017 (0.277)      -5.999 (0.00*) -1.300 (0.178) -6.156 (0.00*)
Note: P-value is given in parenthesis; *denotes the rejection of the existence of unit 
Table 1: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) Unit Root Tests
The results of the Johansen Test for the whole period, January 1999 to June
2009 fail to reject the null of no cointegration at 5% level of significance. Since
the sample used for this analysis includes the financial crisis period, and in
line with sudden interest cuts by the BoE at the onset of the financial crisis,
structural break tests based on Bai and Perron (2003) were carried out to sta-
tistically investigate structural change of the series. Table 2 reports the Bai-
Perron structural break tests. Both coefficients are significant at the conven-
tional level of significance and the BIC as well as LWZ suggest the existence of
one break. The suggested break date is 2007:08 with Confidence interval
between 2006:12 and 2008:08. 
Consequently, cointegration tests using data for the period of January 1999
to July 2007 were carried out. The results are reported in Table 3, from which
it is observable that the existence of a co-integrating relationship between
each retail rate and the LIBOR is confirmed at 5% level for the period 1999:01
to 2007:07. Consequently, an ECM as discussed in Section 3 was estimated.
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Coefficients Break Date 95% CI Breaks Selected
β1         4.88**
(0.09) 2007:09 2006:12 - 2008:08     BIC 1
β2 2.65**
(0.31) LWZ 1
**Significant at 5%. β1and β2 are mean prior to and after the 
break, respectively.
Table 2: Bai-Perron Structural Break Tests
Variable Adjusted           Cointegration   Trace Prob.
(lag) Sample Size Test Rank Statistic
Instant Deposit 100 26.854 0.0007*
(2) 1.890 0.169
Time Deposit 99 23.718 0.002*
(3) 3.575 0.059
Lending Rate 98 15.218 0.005*
(4) 2.087 0.149
Mortgage Rate 100 15.983 0.042*
(2) 1.411 0.235
Notes *denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of no co-integrating 
vector at the 5 % level; r is the number of co-integrating vectors.
r=0
r 1
r=0
r 1
r=0
r 1
r=0
r 1
≤
≤
≤
≤
Table 3: Johansen Cointegration Tests for 1999:01 - 2007:07
For each retail rate, the ECM given by equation (3) was estimated and
the results are reported in Table 4. It is clear that the explanatory power of the
model across different retail rates is quite strong and similar, except for the
time deposit rate where it is roughly 10 per cent lower at 67 per cent. 
4.1 Pass-Through in The Long-Run 
The Delta Method is employed to find the long-run coefficients and the stan-
dard errors. The results are presented in Table 5. To test for the significance
of the long-run coefficients of the retail rate, Wald Test proposed by Pesaran,
Shin and Smith (2001) was used to test for the significance of the coefficients
Ai and Ci of each retail rate. The null hypothesis of no  long-run pass-through,
and                 in equation (3) for each of the four retail rates
against the alternative was tested. In all the four cases the null hypotheses
was rejected in favour of the alternative. In order to check whether it is appro-
priate and essential to include the long-run value of the retail rate given by x*it
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αi
Δyt
xi,t-1
yt-1
Δxi,t-1
Δyt-1
Δxi,t-2
Δyt-2
Δxi,t-3
Δyt-3
R2
DW
SC LM Test
(P-value)
ARCH-LM Test
(P-value)
JB Test
(P-value)
T
-0.153**
0.055*
-0.235**
0.207**
-0.094
0.383**
-0.032
0.156*
0.033
-0.003
0.76
2.037
0.652
(0.529)
0.399
(0.529)
3.96
(0.138)
99
-0.069*
0.123**
-0.142**
0.146**
-0.252**
0.383
-0.007
0.048
na
na
0.67
1.987
0.181
(0.835)
0.512
(0.476)
3.170
(0.205)
100
0.540**
0.142**
-0.257**
0.239**
-0.342**
0.504**
-0.092**
0.336
0.113**
0.112*
0.78
2.039
0.515
(0.599)
0.477
(0.491)
0.795
(0.672)
99
0.567**
0.137**
-0.276**
0.259**
-0.328**
0.501**
-0.063
0.322*
0.095
0.087
0.77
2.046
0.652
(0.421)
0.652
(0.421)
3.58
(0.166)
99
Table 4: Results for Dynamic ECM 
Instant
deposit
Mortgage
rate
Lending
rate
Time
deposit
Note: ** and * denote that the coefficient is significant at 5% and 10% levels,
respectively. DW is Durbin Watson Statistic; JB is Jarque Bera test; T is num-
ber of observations; na: error message if more lags are added. 
0ii
i
A α
γ
= − = 0ii
i
C δ
γ
= − =
in the ECM model (equation 1), the following regression was estimated: 
and the significance of x*it from the results was tested using the Wald Test.
The null that the coefficient associated to x*it, ϕ=0, as reported in Table 5, was
rejected for all the retail rates, at 5 % level of significance. It is therefore rele-
vant to include x*it in the model in all cases. 
4.2 Short- and Long-Run Dynamics 
Table 6 reports the estimates of the ECM as represented by equation (1). The
results indicate that the explanatory power of the model is similar to that of
model (3) across the retail rates, suggesting strong statistical fitness of the
models. The short-run and the long-run estimates are presented in Table 7.
The coefficient β gives the immediate (short-run) pass-through. It represents
the reaction of retail rates to a change in the LIBOR within the same month.
Only 5.5 per cent of the change in the LIBOR during a particular month is
reflected in the change in instant deposit rate in the same month. A change in
the LIBOR by 100 basis points leads to a 12.7 per cent change in the time
deposit rate, 14.2 per cent in the lending rate and 13.7 per cent in the mort-
gage rate in the same month. So, it is clear that immediate pass-through is
incomplete in all the cases.
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Table 5: Estimated Long-Run Coefficients
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses
Variable
Instant deposit rate
Time deposit rate
Lending rate
Mortgage rate
Long run
x*it = - 0.650 + 0.880yit
(0.162)   (0.034)
x*it = - 0.486 + 1.027yit
(0.338)   (0.070)
x*it =   2.100 + 0.929yit
(0.153)   (0.032)
x*it = 2.057 + 0.938yit
(0.153)   (0.032)
it i i itx = A +C y
The speed of adjustment, |γ| in absolute terms has a sensible economic inter-
pretation if it is significant. It indicates how much of the error/shock occur-
ring this month will be corrected in the next month in order to get the system
back to its long-run value. As indicated in Table 7, γ is significant and nega-
tive in all the four cases. When the retail rate deviates from its equilibrium
value, about 22.8 per cent of the divergence is eliminated during the following
period . The speed of adjustment is more or less similar to the other three of
the retail rates: 23.5 per cent, 25.7 per cent and 27.6 per cent for the instant
deposit, the lending rate and the mortgage rate, respectively. In the case of
time deposit, speed of adjustment was roughly 8 per cent lower, at 14.5 per
cent. This implies that the customers holding instant deposits would benefit
more than those holding time deposit accounts when the LIBOR is rising.
Indeed, the holders of instant deposit accounts would benefit from 23.5 per
cent of the rise of the LIBOR in the next period as compared to holders of time
deposit who would benefit from only 14.5 per cent from the rise. However, the
former would be worse off if the LIBOR is falling. 
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Table 6: Results for ECM 
Note: ** and * denote that the coefficient is significant at 5%  and 10% levels, respectively.
# To have absence of autocorrelation between the residuals, the DW statistic has to lie
between 1.78 and 2.22. The values of DW lie within the range.
R2
DW#
SC LM test
(P-value)
ARCH-LM Test
(P-value)
Jarque Bera
(P-value)
T
0.055*
-0.235**
-0.094
0.383**
-0.032
0.156
0.033
-0.003
0.76
2.037
0.652
0.421
0.399
0.529
3.958
0.138
99
0.137**
-0.276**
-0.328**
0.501**
-0.063
0.322**
0.095
0.087
0.77
2.044
0.854
0.429
0.512
0.476
3.167
0.205
99
0.127**
-0.146**
-0.250**
0.383**
0.022
0.041
0.010
-0.044
0.67
1.978
0.083
0.920
0.268
0.623
3.556
0.193
99
0.142**
-0.257**
-0.342**
0.504**
-0.092
0.336**
0.113*
0.112
0.78
2.039
0.519
0.597
0.477
0.492
0.795
0.672
99
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To see the impact of this difference on borrowing and lending rates, think of a
customer who holds a time deposit account and a repayment mortgage in the
same bank in the UK. If the LIBOR is rising then the customer will find that
14 per cent of the error is corrected in one month while 27.6 per cent is cor-
rected for his mortgage. Hence, the customer will find a faster adjustment for
his mortgage than his deposit rate. This result might be due to the fact that
financial institutions, especially building societies in the UK have a tendency
to subsidise borrowers in cases where rates are rising (see, also Heffernan,
1997). The relationship between each retail rate and the LIBOR is given by the
‘long-run’ column in Table 7. A long-run pass-through, C is close to unity
(C=1) together with a small mark-up, A implies that the retail rate equals the
LIBOR in the long-run. For deposit accounts, it is expected that the long-run
pass through would be less than unity in markets characterised by imperfect
competition. This is because the rate paid on deposit accounts represents a
cost for banks and it is advantageous for the banks not to raise the deposit
rate up to the full amount of the change in the LIBOR. However the long-run
pass-through would be close to unity if the market is highly competitive
because depositors are in a position to search for more attractive rates hence
prompting banks to adjust their deposit rates fully. The long-run mark-up
represented by the coefficient A, exhibits a negative sign in the case of the
deposit rates (implying a mark-down), and a positive sign for the lending and
mortgage rate (implying a mark-up). These signs are in line with the theoreti-
cal expectations. One would expect a mark-down in the price of deposits since
it represents a cost to the banks and a mark-up in the lending rate since it
represents revenue to the banks. Long-run pass-through for the instant
deposit rate is not complete but is relatively high at 88 per cent, with a small
constant term of -0.49. The time deposit rate recorded a complete long run
pass-through. The estimates for the lending rate and the mortgage rate yield
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Instant Deposit 
Rate 
0.055* 23.5% 1 month -0.65 0.88 No 
Time Deposit 
Rate 
0.127** 14.5% 1 month -0.49 1.03 Yes 
Lending Rate 0.142** 25.7% 1 month 2.10 0.93 Yes 
Mortgage Rate 0.137** 27.6% 1 month 2.05 0.94 Yes 
 
Variable Immediateadjustment
(β)
Speed of
adjustment
|γ | ∗ 100
Adjustment
delay
(j)
Mark up
(A)
Pass-
through
(C)
Complete
Passthrough
(C=1)
Short-run Long-run
Table 7:  Short-Run and Long-Run Summary
Note: ** and * indicates the significance at 5% and 10%  levels, respectively.
a long-run complete pass-through. The mark-up coefficient is large and positive
in both cases, suggesting that two retail rates are marked up well above the
LIBOR rate. Based on these findings, it can be argued that the pricing of deposit,
lending and mortgage accounts in the UK follows a competitive structure where
a change in the LIBOR is reflected in the deposit rate in the long-run.
The findings reveal that deviation of each retail rate from its long run
value    does persist after one month. On average, only about 22.8 per cent of
the deviation is corrected within one month. That is, 77.2 per cent of the error
persists after one month. It means that, it takes about 4 months and 12 days
for the whole deviation to be completely corrected. This can be regarded as a fair-
ly quick adjustment. It, therefore, suggests that the retail rates react fully to a
change in the LIBOR but with a time lag. Similar results were reported by
Heffernan (1997). 
The findings reveal that deviation of each retail rate from its long run
value (xi,t-j - x*i,t-j) does persist after one month. On average, only about 22.8
per cent of the deviation is corrected within one month. That is, 77.2 per cent of
the error persists after one month. It means that, it takes about 4 months and
12 days for the whole deviation to be completely corrected. This can be regard-
ed as a fairly quick adjustment. It, therefore, suggests that the retail rates react
fully to a change in the LIBOR but with a time lag. Similar results were report-
ed by Heffernan (1997). 
The immediate adjustment given by β is very slow, with the highest
adjustment of 14.2 per cent in the lending rate. It is reasonable to argue that the
interest rate pass through in the UK is slow and incomplete in the short-run,
but complete in the long-run, probably due to the competitive structure of the
banking sector in the UK. This finding compares very well with previous ones,
particularly, Cottarelli and Koureli (1994), Borio and Fritz (1995) which report-
ed ‘complete’ long-run but ‘incomplete’ short-run pass-through. 
Existence of collusion in the retail banking sector might incite each bank
to try to guess the price setting behaviour of others. This might slow down the
adjustment process to new equilibrium. Similarly, presence of consumer inertia
such that the customers do not possess all up-to-date information about price
setting of banks and are generally perceived to be reluctant to change banks,
which gives opportunity to the banks to practise price discrimination. Banks
would find frequent re-pricing of products in response to changes in the policy
rate expensive. This will encourages the banks to stick to the rate already set to
avoid menu or sunk costs, thus leading to incomplete pass-through. 
4.3 Tests for asymmetry adjustments
The asymmetric correction model described by equation (5) was estimated to
investigate if retail rates adjust differently depending on whether they are below
or above their long-run equilibrium level. The results for this model are report-
ed in Table 8. 
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The asymmetric response of retail rates to the changes in the LIBOR could be dis-
cerned by observing the coefficients α1 and α2. As reported in the table, both coef-
ficients are negative and significant in all cases. That is when the instant deposit
rate is higher than the LIBOR in the previous period, it adjusts downward by 0.33
in the current period. On the other hand, it adjusts upward only by 0.21 when it
is higher than the LIBOR in the previous period. Therefore, downward adjustment
for instant deposit rate is 12 per cent higher than the upward adjustment. This
shows that instant deposit rate is rigid upward — a result which is valid in con-
centrated market, where banks are in a better position to avoid a price increase
on deposits to minimise the cost of their funds. However, adjustment in time
deposit rate to changes in the LIBOR appears to be symmetrical, where α1=α2=14
per cent meaning that upward adjustment is equal to downward adjustment.
The downward adjustment of 0.32 takes place in the next period when
the lending rate is higher than the LIBOR in the previous period. The upward
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Table 8: Estimation for Asymmetric Adjustment
Note: **  and * denotes the significance level at 5% and 10% , respectively.
R2
DW#
SC LM test
(P-value)
ARCH-LM Test
(P-value)
Jarque Bera
(P-value)
Wald Test Statistic
(P-value)
T
*
, ,
*
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, 1
1
, 2
2
, 3
3
( )
( )
t
i t j i t j
i t j i t j
i t
t
i t
t
i t
t
y
V x x
W x x
x
y
x
y
x
y
− −
− −
−
−
−
−
−
−
Δ
−
−
Δ
Δ
Δ
Δ
Δ
Δ
0.056
-0.327**
-0.215**
-0.086
0.349**
-0.031
0.142*
0.035
-0.004
0.762
2.037
0.652
0.421
0.258
(0.613)
3.512
(0.172)
2.446
(0.122)
99
0.141**
-0.329**
-0.261**
-0.320**
0.490**
-0.064
0.313**
0.098*
0.087
0.771
2.038
0.662
0.519
0.389
(0.534)
2.739
(0.254)
0.414
(0.521)
99
0.126**
-0.143**
-0.147**
-0.250**
0.383**
0.025
0.041
0.011
-0.044
0.668
1.977
0.124
0.884
0.450
(0.529)
3.968
(0.138)
0.011
(0.919)
99
0.146**
-0.319**
-0.242**
-0.329**
0.490**
-0.091
0.324**
0.116**
0.109
0.777
2.030
0.353
0.704
0.249
(0.619)
0.616
(0.735)
0.553
(0.459)
99
Instant
deposit
Mortgage
rate
Lending
rate
Time
deposit
adjustment is of 0.24 where the lending rate is lower than the LIBOR in the pre-
vious period. The results are similar to that of the mortgage rate. These are
indicative that lending rates can also be characterised by upward rigidity, which
might appear counter intuitive. One would think that banks would like to ben-
efit from the rise in lending rate to maximise their revenue. But a plausible
explanation could be found in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), where it was shown that
banks are reluctant to adjust their loan rates upwards, but not downwards. This
reluctance in raising rates is due to the risk of losing safe borrowers and attract-
ing those who are riskier. 
4.4 Effect of the financial crisis on the IRPT
Based on the structural break results of Bai and Perron (2003) presented above,
August 2007 was taken to be the date marking the structural break in interest-
rate pass-through. The rise in the LIBOR from 5.86 per cent in July 2007 to 6.22
per cent in August 2007 gave the first signal for the initial effect of the credit
crunch.7 This marks the date which breaks the cointegrating relationship
between each retail rate and the LIBOR. The procedure of Jobst and Kwapil
(2008) was adopted to test for the effect of the financial crisis on the IRPT. The
idea is to use the estimations of 1999:01-2007:07 which give relationships
between each retail rate and the LIBOR for 8½ years as the historical basis to
forecast the evolution of each retail rate for the second half of 2007 up to July
2009.8 This forecast is then compared with the actual movement of the retail
rates. The result of this comparison is reported in Figure 2. It could be observe
that the evolution of the change in instant deposit rate after August 2008 seems
to follow the historical pattern. This, therefore, indicate that the credit crunch
has not impacted on the banks’ behaviour in setting the instant deposit rate.
However, in the case of other retail rates, it is observed that they were not
reduced as much as the historical patterns suggest as shown in Figures 3, 4 and
5. It is evident from the figures that the change in time deposit rate was higher
than the forecast value as from the mid-2008. The LIBOR, which was about 6.22
per cent in August, 2007, declined to about 0.5 per cent by June, 2009, repre-
senting a loss of 90 per cent of its value. The time deposit rate however, was
reduced from 5.09 per cent in August 2007 to 2.74 per cent in June 2009, a
decrease of only 46.1 per cent over the whole period.  A plausible argument for
this behaviour is the willingness of the UK banks to keep existing savers and
even attract new ones in face of the shortage of liquidity due to the credit
crunch. In the case of the lending and mortgage rates, the respective forecast
rates seem to diverge from the actual rate for the period starting from August
2007. It is relevant to note that two major UK banks, Halifax and Abbey had
raised their mortgage rates for new borrowers by 2% during this period (Walayat,
2007). Other financial institutions also followed by raising their interest rates by
the end of 2007. The likely reason being rise in bad debt due to the credit
crunch, which prompted banks to tighten their lending criteria despite the fall 
Economic Issues, Vol. 18, Part 1, 2013
- 31 -
in the LIBOR. But Alliance and Leicester and the Bank of Scotland had left their
rates unchanged till December 2007.9 This reflects the observation of Skenfield
(2009):10  ‘Despite this low rate environment, there is a significant disparity in
the amount of this saving being passed on to mortgage borrowers by the main
UK lenders.’
Figures 4 and 5 indicate that the actual lending and mortgage rates since
2008 were indeed higher than those predicted by the historical pattern.
Overall, the results show that the pass-through of the LIBOR rate to the
retail rates became weaker since the beginning of the financial crisis in August
2007. Banks seem to adopt a safer approach to preserve liquidity from deposi-
tors and avoid default from borrowers. 
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Figure 2: Relationship between Actual Instant Deposit Rate and the Forecast Rate
Figure 3: Relationship between Actual Time Deposit Rate and the Forecast Rate
4.5 Robustness checks
To check for the robustness of the estimated results, the residuals of the mod-
els were subjected to homoscedasticity, normality and autocorrelation tests.
Homoscedasticity is verified through the ARCH LM Test of Engle (1982) where
the null cannot be rejected at 5% level for all the four retail rates. Thus, the
residuals are homoscedastic. The normality of errors is checked through the
Jarque Bera Test where the null hypothesis is the normality of the errors can-
not be rejected for all the retail rates. Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic has sug-
gested that the residuals have no autocorrelation. However, the DW statistic
has some limitations, especially when there are lagged dependent variables on
the right hand-side of the regression. As a result, the Breusch-Godfrey Serial
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Figure 4. Relationship between Actual Lending Rate and the Forecast Rate
Figure 5. Relationship between Actual Mortgage Rate and the Forecast Rate
Correlation LM Test was used and the results indicate that the null of no seri
al correlation cannot be rejected in either case. 
5. CONCLUSION
This paper analysed the transmission mechanism of interest rates in the UK
using monthly data from 1999:01 to 2009:06. The LIBOR was used as a proxy
for the policy rate and the study examined how changes in the LIBOR are
passed-through to four retail rates. For each retail rate, an ECM was utilised
to identify the immediate adjustment and the speed of adjustment. The long-
run pass-through, the long-run mark-up which determine the long-run equi-
librium was also estimated. The empirical results revealed that the UK bank-
ing system adjusts its retail interest rates in response to the changes in the
LIBOR completely in the long-run, while adjustment in the short-run is found
to be incomplete. This result is consistent with the findings of Cottarelli and
Koureli (1994) and Borio and Fritz (1995), but contrasts with most of the lit-
erature on the IRPT where pass-through is found to be generally incomplete
even in the long-run.
It is argued in the literature that monetary policy will be more effective,
particularly, in controlling inflation, if immediate pass-through is complete
(see for example, Fuertes and Heffernan, 2009).  But this study reveals that
the maximum immediate adjustment stands only at 14.2%. This incomplete
short-run pass-through might hinder the potency of the monetary policy.
However, the results indicate that it takes not more than four months for the
whole transmission to complete. It could be, therefore, argued that if this peri-
od is predictable by the economic agents, it can act as a signal to them for the
formulation of their savings and investment decisions and hence improve the
short-run effectiveness of the monetary policy.
It is also found that asymmetric behaviour across the different retail
rates is apparent. The results suggest that interest rates on deposit, lending
and mortgage adjust asymmetrically depending on whether the retail rates are
above or below their long-run equilibrium value. However, time rate did not
exhibit asymmetric adjustment. 
The analysis also contributed to the existing literature by analysing the
impact of the credit crunch on the IRPT in the UK. It was found that the retail
rates deviated from their historical pattern suggesting that the financial crisis
has impacted on the financial institutions’ behaviour in setting retail rates.
This is particularly with deposit, lending and mortgage rates. 
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ENDNOTES
1. Ahmad Hassan Ahmad: Department of Economics, University of Bath, Claverton
Down, Bath, BA2 7AY, United Kingdom, A.h.Ahmad@bath.ac.uk. Nusrate Aziz:
Graduate School of Management, Multimedia University, Cyberjaya 63100, Malaysia
and Shahina Rummun, Department of Economics, JG Smith Building, University of
Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT, United Kingdom. We are very grateful for the ref-
erees' useful and constructive comments. We also acknowledge the useful comments
we received from the editor.
2. For full discussion on the evolution of the UK banking system, see Davies et al.
(2010).
3. For full detailed survey, see de Bondt, Mojon, and Valla (2005) and Kok Sorensen
and Werner (2006).
4. For full discussion of the model, see Bai and Perron (2003).
5. Heffernan (1997) provides econometric justification for choosing the LIBOR as a
proxy for the policy rate (see Heffernan, 1997, p.223). Instead of pass-through from the
policy rate, we will therefore focus on the pass-through from a short term money mar-
ket rate. But as observed on figure 1, the LIBOR adjusts quickly to the BoE's official
rate, which will enable us to extend our findings to changes in the policy rate. The use
of the LIBOR will also enable us to study the potential impact of the credit crunch on
the IRPT. 
6. Calculated as a mean of the 4 coefficients of speed of adjustment:
(23.5+14.5+25.7+27.6)/4=22.8.
7.Conway (2007), ‘Libor soars as credit crunch returns’, www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/economics/. 
8. The forecast is based on h-step ahead, which is more relevant in this case.
9. MSN Money Consumer Champion (2007). 
10. Myfinances.co.uk (2009), http://www.myfinances.co.uk/mortgages/2009/8/20/
mortgage-lenders-fail-to-pass-on-interest-rate.
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